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Grenfell Report


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With the publication of the report following the first phase of the inquiry, the media have latched on to two main threads, the systematic failings of the London Fire Brigade and that the stay put policy should have been changed earlier.

Firstly do you think that LFB are being made scapegoats for the fire and secondly what real alternatives are there to stay put?

Matt Wreck from the FBU has been across numerous TV and radio programs defending firefighters and putting the focus back on Government and policy makers, who have said they will implement the recommendations in full, however we've been here before after previous high rise inquiries. He also makes a very good point that 28 months after the fire, no research or tests have been conducted into a replacement for stay put.

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Its piss poor media reporting @Keith

I have had a look through all for volumes of the report today with the emphasis on volume 4 - which contain the recommendations 

There are 12 for hi rise owners, 12 for the LFB and 8 for all fire and rescue services. But guess who got the most crap in the media 

Some of the recommendations are weak and poorly thought out. For example, owners of high rises to firefighting lifts regularly , especially the firefighters control switch - and report their findings monthly to the fire service. Really? That won't work

Other findings relate to changes as  NPAS helicopter cctv images using different encryption than the LFB, so no images could be seen -  reasonable I reckon

A summary of recommendations is as follows:


The owner & manager of every high rise premises, by law provide information to their local fire & rescue service in relation to design and materials used in external walls

Fire services ensure staff at all levels are able to understand & recognise risks with fires in external walls of such premises

5) 7(2)D VISITS

  • LFB to review 72d arrangements
  • LFB to train crew managers to inspect high rise buildings in respect of the 72d (was 1id)


  • Owner and manager of high rise presumes, by law, provide plans to the local fire & rescue service
  • Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, install premises information boxes for plans


  • Owner and manager of high rise presumes, by law, carry out regular inspections of firefighting lifts and report findings to the fire service on a monthly basis.
  • Owner and manager of high rise presumes, by law, carry out checks regular checks of firefighting lift switching mechanism and report findings to the fire service on a monthly basis


  • LFB to review policies on comms between control room and Incident Manager
  • LFB to ensure all above CM receive training in communicating with control room
  • LFB to ensure Control Room Officers above Ass Ops Manager rank receive training in communication with Incident Manager


  • LFB policy be amended to separate callers into those trapped & those seeking advice
  • LFB to train CROs more effectively and regularly
  • All fire services draw up plans to deal with large number of simultaneous fire survival calls
  • All fire services develop systems to display fire survival calls at the control room & bridgehead
  • All fire services develop policies to manage a transition from ‘stay put’ to ‘get out’ (sic)
  • All fire services train control room staff to communicate a change of advice to callers
  • All fire services investigate measures to allow other control rooms taking calls to access appropriate information about the incident
  • Met Pol, LAS and LFB to improve protocols to ensure identical advice is given to callers


  • LFB to develop procedures to better control deployments and use of resources
  • LFB to develop better procedures to debrief crews returning from deployment which enables such information to be made available to the Incident Manager.
  • LFB to develop better comms between the control room and Incident Manager - and the Bridgehead and Incident Manager


LFB to develop better comms between firefighters and Bridgehead in high rise incidents


  • HM Govt to produce guidelines on carrying out evacuation of high rises, including disabled persons
  • All fire services to develop plans for evacuating high rise residential buildings & train their staff to do so
  • Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, draw up emergency plans and supplies those plans to fire service and in premises info boxes
  • Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, prepare PEEPs (for disable residents)
  • All fire & rescue service carry smoke hoods


  • Owner and manager of high rise premises, by law, clearly mark the floor number on landings on every floor
  • Owner and manager of any resident building with separate dwellings (of any size), by law, provide evacuation instructions in a manner the resident can understand


  • Owner and manager of high rise premises containing separate dwellings (whether high rise or not) urgently inspect their fire doors to ensure their compliance
  • Owner and manager of high rise premises containing separate dwellings (whether high rise or not), by law, to inspect fire doors and self closers to ensure compliance and in good condition
  • Those whatever capacity who have responsibility for entrance doors to flats in buildings fitted with unsafe cladding, be required by law to ensure doors are compliant


  • Various recommendations for all 999 services to coordinate better
  • LFB to investigate systems so that they can see the Mets and LAS’s CAD logs
  • Steps be taken to ensure LFB and NPAS (National Police Air Service)  helicopters use the same encryption systems to allow LFB to view NPAS heli- link  (the Inquiry fails to allocate this action to any group)
  • Met and LFB to liaise to investigate improvement on casualty clearing and collection of information about survivors
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Did the LFB fit dodgy, highly flammable cladding to the building, thereby destroying it's inherent ability to compartmentalise a fire? Did the LFB light the fire?


There is no doubt there are always lessons to be learnt from a job of any significant size, so it may have been ill-advised to suggest otherwise, but the reporting thus far is deeply unpleasant and inflammatory towards the LFB and the Commissioner and unhelpful.


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Beginning of the year I attended a exercise at LFB control. It’s main focus was to test mass evacuations in another grenfell type situation. 

I have no idea what the outcome of it was but the brigade are definitely exploring alternatives

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Have to agree @Messyshaw, some of the recommendations are weak and poorly thought out. Whilst some may be specific to the incident or LFB, majority could be a copy and paste from previous inquiries, that sadly haven't been acted on.

I think it safe to say that report has not gone down well within the fire service community. This excellent blog from @Steve sums it up and is well worth a read.

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